The king's courts and the king's soul: pardoning as almsgiving in medieval England by McSweeney, Thomas J.
The king's courts and the king's soul: 
pardoning as almsgiving in medieval 
England 
Article 
Published Version 
McSweeney, T. J. (2014) The king's courts and the king's soul: 
pardoning as almsgiving in medieval England. Reading 
Medieval Studies, XL. pp. 159­175. ISSN 0950­3129 Available 
at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/84586/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Publisher: University of Reading 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
4 
Reading Medieval Srudies XL (2014) 
The King's Courts and the King's Soul: 
Pardoning as Almsgiving in Medieval England 
Thomas J. McSweeney' 
William & MOlY Law School 
The early history of the common law is usually written as a story of increasing 
rationalization.! The royal courts of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were 
creating an ever more sophisticated system of rules around the new procedures Henry [( 
introduced bctwcen the I I 50s and the I I 70s. Thatsystem of rules had an internal logic to 
it. It was a legal logic, designed to eliminate irrelevant facts and narrow the question in the 
case. A court no longer necded to know a defendant's social status or whether he was a 
habitual sinner, for instance. It only needed to know whether he had, in fact, disseised the 
plaintiff of the land. ' The logic of the law simplified things, decreased the number of 
questions a court was forced to ask, and thus created a sense that justice was, and should be, 
blind to qualities like social status, which werc legally irrelevant. 
Pardons occupy an ambiguous space in this story of ever more rational law. On the 
one hand, pardons can act as a safety valve. When the law fails to do justice, some official 
is empowered to pardon the person whom the law, in its rigidity, would convict unjustly. 
Pardons can thus promote justice by fixing those anomalous situations where the legal system 
fails. On the other hand, pardons have the potential to reintroduce the irrelevancies that the 
law seeks to purge from decision-making. Pardons require no justification. In the thirteenth 
century, the king could pardon a killer for any reason or no reason. He could pardon a killer 
because that killer had powerful supporters or because he had agreed to serve in one of the 
king's wars, rcasons that had no bearing on his culpability and thus had no lcgal significance. ' 
When misused, pardons can represent the failure of a rational system of law. 
I would like to thank Karl Shoemaker, Liz Kamali , Helen Lacey, Charl ie Donahue, Phillipp Schofield 
and the participants in panels at the 2013 meeting of the American Society for Legal History and the 
48th International Congress on Medieval Studies for their valuable comments on this paper. There is, 
of course, one more person i have to thank. This article grew out of a paper I wrote for Paul Hyams's 
seminar on medieval poverty in 2007. It was Paul who originally suggested that ilry 10 sort out what 
was going on with the pardons for poverty that we see on the pica rolls and I happily dedicate this 
article to him. 
2 See, e.g. S. F. C. MiIsom, The Legal Framework of English Feudalism (Cambridgc: CUP, 1976); Harold 
J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 457 ff. 
3 This is not to say that social status no longer had any effect over the outcome of trials, only that legal 
discourse began to treat social status as if it should be irrelevant to the outcome. 
4 Naomi Hurnard, The King s Pardon for Homicide Before AD 1307 (Oxford: OUP, 1969), p. 36. 
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In her magisterial work on royal pardons for homicide, Naomi Hurnard explored both 
of these tendencies. 5 Hurnard surveyed hundreds of pardons, looking for trends in the ways 
they operated. She found that thirteenth-century kings would ordinarily issue pardons in 
cases where the killing was either accidental or committed in self-defense. The king clearly 
thought that these types of killing were less culpable than, say, an intentional killing in cold 
blood and he even created judicial procedures for detennining whether a pardon was 
warranted on one of these two grounds.o Modern lawyers have little trouble understanding 
this pattern of pardoning. Our own rules of culpability exclude the accidental killing and the 
killing in self-defense from the definition of murder. It is too easy, however, to see our own 
reflection in the pardoning practices of the thirteenth century and to miss significant 
differences between medieval and modem discourses of pardoning. Thirteenth-century'kings, 
as it turns out, issued pardons for many reasons that had nothing at all to do with the party's 
culpability. These pardons do not fit into a model where a pardon should be given to ensure 
that justice is done. They seem to be capricious acts of will rather than measured acts of law. 
When Hurnard found these seemingly arbitrary pardons in her sources, she treated them as 
a failure of the system.' 
Pardons that appear arbitrary to us may not have seemed so to contemporaries, 
however. In this article, I will look at two types of pardons, pardons of amercements and 
pardons for homicide, and show that pardoning practices stood at the intersection of at least 
two discourses. The first is the discourse oflaw. In many cases, the king and his officials did 
grant pardons because the discourses of law that were current in the thirteenth century, the 
ones that focused on the killer and his culpability, dictated that the killer should not be 
punished. Often, however, the pardon had little or nothing to do with the killer's culpability. 
We find many instances on the patent rolls and the pleas rolls where a killer or an amerced 
party is pardoned 'for the king's soul', placing the pardon within a different discourse 
altogether: a discourse of alms. Pardons that were meant to bring spiritual benefit to the king 
were not irrational; they simply operated according to a different kind of reason than the 
law did. 
Pardons that were given as alms challenge our notion of what a court is and what it 
should do. We think of courts as entities that are concerned with law, and law alone. There 
were certainly people who thought about courts in this way in the thirteenth century. The 
justices who wrote the great treatises of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries seem to have 
thought this way and tried to marginalize other ways of thinking about courts in their texts. 
Modern scholars give them quite a bit of credence because the justices who wrote texts like 
5 Hurnard, King 's Pardon/or Homicide. 
6 Hurnard, King's Pardon/or Homicide, pp. 77-78 
7 Hurnard, King's Pardon/or Homicide, p. 36. 
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the Brae/on treatise thought about courts in essentially the same way we do today. Their 
writings line up with our own expectations. They were only one group within the royal 
administration, however, and others saw the courts as institutions that were as concerned with 
the king's soul as they were with the king's justice. 
Pardoning the Abbey: Ramsey, Meaux and the King's Soul 
In 1229 the Abbot of the wealthy and powerful Benedictine monastery of Ramsey in 
Huntingdonshire was sued by four men who claimed that the Abbot had disseised them of 
their common right in a pasture. ' The jury delivered a verdict against the Abbot and the court 
issued a judgment awarding seisin of the pasture and 5s. in damages to the four mcn.9 Near 
the end of the entry, the clerk who was keeping the roll of the court additionally noted that 
'the abbot is in mercy' . 10 This is a common notation to find on the plea rolls and indicates 
that the Abbot had been amerced. An amercement is akin to a modem fine and could be 
levied for many reasons. If a plaintiff failed to prosecute her case once she had begun it, she 
was amerced for non-prosecution. 1I If she did prosecute the case but lost, she was amerced 
for a false claim. If a defendant lost his case, say, for a parcel ofland, as the Abbot of Ramsey 
had done, he would be amerced for unlawful detention of the land. " The theory behind the 
amercement was that, by committing one of these bad acts, the party had harmed the king 
and was now in his mercy. He would have to placate the king to get himself out of it. 
The most common way to placate the king was with a cash payment. Since in theory 
the hapless litigant was entirely in the mercy of the king, the amercement could be of any 
amount. 13 The Angevin Kings had used amercements both as a means of revenue-production 
and as a means of political control. Great lords could be amerced beyond their means to pay, 
even for relatively minor offenses, putting them in the king's debt. [fthey continued to please 
the king, the debt could be put off indefinitely, but if they did not, the debt could be called 
in. 14 The king's ability to levy amercements had been curtailed in Magna Carta, however, and 
8 Curia Regis Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 20 vo[s (hereinafter CRR) (London: HMSO, 
and Woodbridge: BoydetJ, 1922-2002), xiii {I 959), p. 421 (no. 20 II). 
9 CRR, xiii, p. 422 (no. 2011). 
to CRR, xiii , p. 422 (no. 20 II). 
[ I C. A. F. Mcekings, The 1235 Surrey Eyre, Volume I· Introduction (Gui ldford: Surrey Record Society, 
31,1979),p.39. 
12 Mcekings, 1235 Surrey Eyre, pp. 85-86. 
13 See Meekings, 1235 Surrey Eyre, p. 86. 
14 J. L. Bolton, 'The English Economy in the Early Thirteenth Century' , in King John: New Interpretations, 
ed. by S. D. Church (Woodbridge: BoydetJ, (999), pp. 27-40 (p. 29). 
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for most litigants the process of seeking the king's mercy had become rather mechanical by 
the 1220s." For routine amercements the justices usually charged the small, but not wholly 
insignificant, amount of half a mark, equivalent to eighty pence, the price of a decent riding 
horse or haifa dozen sheep,I6 This would have been a heavy burden for a small-time peasant 
farmer, but not for a large monastery like Ramsey. 
Amercements, once levied, did not have to be collected. The amercement was separate 
from any damages the amerced party might have to pay the winner of the suit and went 
wholly to the king. Since the amercement was entirely within the king's discretion - with 
no other parties to satisfy - the king could thus pardon the amercement if he wished. We 
know of amercement pardons as early as Henry II's re,ign and, from the beginning:of the 
royal courts' records, every term includes a few, l? We do not know exactly who did the 
pardoning or how a litigant went about seeking a pardon in most cases. Juries may have 
pardoned amercements at times; Magna Carta guaranteed that the amount of the amercement 
would be set by 'the testimony of reputable men ofthe neighborhood'. " It appears that court 
practice in the decades after Magna Carta was for the justices themselves to set the initial 
amount of the amercement and then send it to ajury, which might reduce the amount. 19 These 
juries presumably pardoned some of the amercements, but the rolls show us that they were 
not the only ones who did so. The king/o the king's council,21 the treasurer,22 the justiciar,23 
and the royal justices themselves are all said to pardon amercements in various cases. 24 
15 J. C. Holt, Magna Carta, second edn (Cambridge: CUP, 1992) pp. 456-7, 505 (cc. 20-22 of the 1215 
version of Magna Carta, c. 14 of the 1225 version). 
16 Meekings, 1235 Surrey Eyre, p. 130. John Hudson, The Formation of the English Common Law: Law 
and Society in England from the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta (New York: Longman, 1996), p. 
169. Paul Latimer, 'Early Thirteenth-Century Prices ', in King John: New interpretations, ed. by Church 
(Woodbridge, Boydell, 1999), pp. 41-73 (pp. 70, 73). 
17 L. W. Vernon Harcourt, 'The Amercement of Barons by their Peers ', English Historical Review, 22 
(1907),732-740 (p. 734, n. 14). 
18 Holt, Magna Carta, pp. 457, 505 (c. 20 of the 1215 version of Magna Carta and c. 14 of the 1225 
version). 
19 Harcourt, The Amercement of Barons', p. 734. 
20 CRR, ix, p. 198; eRR, xi , pp. 41 (no. 238),135, (no. 675). It is worth noting that in all of these cases, 
the King was a minor. The decision to pardon must have been made by someone other than the king 
himself. 
21 CRR, viii, p. 196; CRR, xi, p. 50 (no. 288). 
22 CRR, vii i, p. 34. 
23 CRR, viii, p. 331. 
24 CRR, viii, p. 275. 
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The abbey of Ramsey was pardoned its amercement, but it was not pardoned on the 
spot. The pardon came at some point after the proceedings. The clerk added a notation at the 
very end of the entry that '[t)he amercement of the abbot is pardoned by the lords, the 
chancellor Karl ' and S. ofSegrave'. 25 The case had been tried by a special commission, and 
had probably been heard in I-Iuntingdonshire, where the land was situated." But at some 
point the issue of the amercement apparently went to Westminster, where it was pardoned 
at the command of some of the king's most important functionaries. 
The entry does not tell us why these officials of the central government saw fit to 
pardon Ramsey. Some of our pardons do provide a reason, however. The pardons that appear 
on the rolls of the early thirteenth century most often say that they have been given account 
of the litigant's poverty. 2: The royal coutis were, in this period, attracting more and more 
litigants at the lower end of the social scale, and there must have been quite a few people for 
whom half a mark represented a large part of their annual incomc. To thc extent that 
historians have looked at these pardons at all, they have tended to assume that the pardons 
worked according to a logic of justice. They were intended to prevent the poor man from 
being completely ruined simply because he had sought to vindicate his rights and had turned 
out not to have any. There is contemporary evidence for this view of amercements. Magna 
Carta had treated them as an issue of justice, prohibiting amercements that would destroy 
the amerced party's livelihood or that were totally disproportionate to the wrong committed.2~ 
25 Misericordia abbatis perdonatur per dominos cancel/ariurn Karl' et S. de Segrave: CRR, xiii, p. 422 (no. 
20J 1). The attribution to cancel/arium Karl' on the plea roll is probably incOiTect. The chancellor at the 
time was Ralph de Neville, Bishop of Chichester, and neither his name nor his title could easily be 
abbreviated Karl ': Fred A. Cazel, Jr, 'Neville, Ralph de (d. 1244)', in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography [ODNS] <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/articleI19949?docPos=5 > [accessed 28 February 
2014]. The treasurer in 1229, however, was Walter Mauclerk, Bishop of Carlisle, which could be 
abbreviated as Karl': Nicholas Vincent, 'Mauclerk, Walter (d. 1248)', in ODNB 
<http://www.oxforddnb.comlview/article/lS355?docPos=I >[accessed28February2014].ltis possible 
that the clerk who composed this roll was copying from an earlier draft and accidentally omitted a few 
words. The entry should probably read 'the chancellor, the bishop of Carlisle [i.e., the treasurer], and 
Stephen of Segrave'. I would like to thank Kathleen Neal for this suggested reading. Thc treasurer 
presided over the exchequer and the chancellor often sat there, as well. Stephen ofSegrave, in addition 
to being an impoI1ant royal justice, perfonned many duties for the king and might have been present in 
the exchequer when this amercement came up. Ralph V. Turner, Men Raised from the Dust: 
Administrative Service and Upward Mobility in Angevin England (Philadelph ia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1988), pp. 123-S. The amercement was therefore probably pardoned at the order 
of three of the King's most important ministers. 
26 CRR, xiii, p. 422 (no. 20 II). 
27 Of 120 amercement pardons I have surveyed on the CRR of 120 1-1224, eighty specifically say they were 
given on account of the party 's poverty. They rolls often simply say: Misericordia. Pauper est 
(' Amercement. He is a pauper'), but sometimes appear as the more specific: Misericordia. Perdonatur 
pro paupertate (' Amercement. It is pardoned for poverty'). 
28 Holt, Magna Carta, pp. 457, 505 (c . 20 of the 1215 version of Magna Carta and c. 14 of the 1225 
version). 
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Not all amercement pardons fit this model, however. When pardons do not fit neatly into a 
narrative of justice, scholars often try to make them fit. Alfred May, in his survey of 
amercement pardons in seigniorial courts, found many amercement pardons for parties who 
did not actually appear to be poor. He argued that pardons to litigants who were not poor in 
absolute terms were meant to spare people who were temporarily short of cash, taking the 
position that there must have been some principled reason to pardon these people.29 It is 
difficult to find a principled reason to spare Ramsey, however. Ramsey's amercement was 
not explicitly pardoned on account of poverty. It may have been the unstated reason for the 
pardon, but this seems unlikely, as it would be difficult to make the case that Ramsey had a 
cash flow problem. Ramsey was one of the wealthiest monasteries in all of England and 
enjoyed substantial royal patronage under Henry Ill.'" There is no doubt that Ramsey could 
afford to pay an amercement of haifa mark. 
Another monastery had been placed in a very similar position to Ramsey six years 
earlier, and may shed some light on Ramsey's pardon. The great Cistercian house of Meaux 
in Yorkshire was pardoned an amercement in a 1223 land case.31 Meaux, like Ramsey, had 
no cash flow problem at the time it was amerced. The chronicle of the abbey contains five 
folios devoted to their land transactions between 12 10 and 1220." By 1223 Meaux had been 
amply endowed with gifts of new lands from Yorkshire families and the monks were actively 
purchasing land.ll They were even lending money out, so they must have had cash on hand. }4 
They could certainly pay half a mark. 
We might be able to fit both Ramsey and Meaux into a model where pardons were 
intended to do justice, as both houses had suffered under King John. Ramsey was without 
an Abbot between 1207 and 1214 because the monks would not elect the candidate John 
29 Alfred N. May, 'An Index of Thirteenlh-Century Peasant Impoverishment? Manor Court Fines' , 
Economic History Review, new series 26, (1973): 389-402 (p. 398). 
30 Matthew Paris, Malt/wei Parisiellsis, Monach; Sanc/i Albani. Chronica Majora , ed. by Henry Richards 
Luard , 7 vols (London, 1872-1884), v (t 880), p. 51, vi (t 882), pp. 390-391. 
31 eRR, xi, p. 234 (no. 1149) 
32 Thomas de Burton, Chronica monaslerii de Me/sa, afimdatione usque ad annum 1396, aUClore Thoma 
de Burton, abbale. Accedit cOlltinualio ad annum 1406 a monacho quodam ipsius domus, ed. by Edward 
A. Bond, 3 vols (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1866- 1868), i (1866), pp. 359-380 
33 Burton, Chronica monasterii de Me/sa , p. 373. 
34 Burton, Chronica mOllaslerii de Me/sa , pp. 367, 374. 
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preferred and John would not pennit them to elect anotber. 3S Meaux had suffered even more. 
The Cistercian order in England, pleading special privileges granted by John's predecessors, 
had claimed to be exempt from the various taxes John raised to pay for his wars in Ireland 
and France." In 1210 their dispute with the King came to a head when John tried to force 
the Cistercian houses to pay up: the Abbot of Meaux resigned in protest and John sent his 
men to seize the monastery.37 John eventually expelled the monks from the monastery's lands 
later that year, but allowed them to return in exchange for a fine of 1000 marks. '" This 
treatment at John's hands may have prompted the pardons of both monasteries, as the 
Cistercian order had many sympathizers in England who thought John's actions towards 
them had been illicit. But pardoning an amercement of half a mark is a clumsy way of 
returning 1000 marks that had been taken illicitly. ]r"the two monasteries were pardoned out 
of a sense of justice, it was a rough justice. 
Fortunately, the entry for Meaux's case, unlike that for Ramsey's, tells us why the 
amercement was pardoned. Two rolls exist for this tenn of the court, and one tells us that 
'[tlhe amercement is pardoned for the soul of King John' and the other 'for God and for the 
king'." Language indicating that the pardon was intended for the king's soul would have 
clearly marked it as an act of almsgiving to contemporaries. The chancery, which was 
responsible for recording most ofthe king 's grants ofland and gifts of money, regularly used 
words like these to mark that a gift was being made as alms on behalf of the king or members 
of his family. Grants ofland to hospitals, money to feed paupers, funds to build bridges, and 
gifts to religious houses were made for 'the salvation of the king's soul and the souls of his 
ancestors and heirs', or for 'the soul of the Empress, late the king 's sister', or 'for the soul 
of 1. formerly the queen of England, the king's mother', to give just a few examples.'" 
Monasteries were considered particularly worthy recipients of alms, and it might have been 
less a sense of justice that drove the royal officials who pardoned these amercements than a 
sense that giving half a mark to a monastery was good for their royal master's souL 
35 Chronicon Abbatiae Ramesiensis, ed. by W. D. Macray (London: Rolls Series, 1886), p. 342. William 
Page, Granville Proby (editors) assisted by H.E. Norris, 'Houses of Benedictine monks: The Abbey of 
Ramsey', in A History of the County of Huntingdon , 3 vols (Oxford: OUP for the Victoria County 
History, 1926-1936), i (1926), pp. 377-385, British History Online, <http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=3814> [accessed 28 February 2014]. 
36 Burton, Chronica monasterii de Melsa, p. xxx iv. 
37 Burton, Chronica monasterii de Me/sa, p. xxxv. 
38 Burton, Chronica monasterii de Melsa, pp. xxxv, xxxviii. 
39 eRR, xi , p. 234 (no. 11 49). 
40 Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office. 3, Henry Ill, A.D. 1232-1247 
(London; HMSO, \906), p. 341 (October 1242); Calendar of the Liberate rolls Preserved in the Public 
Record Office, ed. by William Henry Stevenson and Cyril Thomas Flower, 6 vols (London: Public 
Record Office, 1916-1964), ii (1930), p. 124 (April 1242); iii (1937), p. 71 (August 1246). 
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The Logic of Justice and the Logic of Alms 
This is not to say that almsgiving was the only lens through which the king or one of 
his officials could see a pardon. In many cases the discourses of alms and Jaw overlapped. 
The largest category of pardons was given to people who were designated pauperes on the 
rolls. The poor were, of course, traditional recipients of alms. Pardoning a pauper 's 
amercement could also be seen as an act of justice, however. Protecting the poor was a 
fundamental duty of the king in the discourse of kingship of the thirteenth century. In the 
fourth century, St Jerome made the case that the king, as God's anointed, must protect the 
poor and weak ifhe was to be a legitimate ruler. 41 It appears that princes - or at least their 
servants - were prepared to take Jerome's pleas serio,usly. The author of the late twelfth-
century treatise known as Glanvill makes a plea for his lord 's justice to the poor, as in the 
royal court 'a poor man is not oppressed by the power of his adversary' .42 Richard FitzNigel's 
Dialogue of the Exchequer also lauds the king's general eyre - ajudicial visitation of the 
counties - as an institution that 'spared the labor and possessions of the poor', because it 
brought the king's justices to the people, instead of requiring the people to find the king if 
they wanted access to his justice.43 The people writing about royal administration from the 
inside in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were thus aware that, while the king had a duty 
to do justice to all his subjects, he had a special duty to do justice to the poor. 
Tt was not only in his capacity as almsgiver that the king showed concern for his soul; 
a king who did not take his God-given duty to do justice seriously might not make his way 
into heaven. Jerome's text on the duty of the king to do justice to the poor made its way into 
Gratian's Decretum , a collection of canon law that became a standard textbook from the 
twelfth century on throughout Latin Christendom. Gratian commented on Jerome's passage 
that 'it is necessary, however, that faith and reverence be preserved by them, the princes and 
the potentates, because he who will not have offered them to God will not attain the 
rewards'.44 Gratian thus attaches the king's duty to do justice to the oppressed to the king's 
own salvation. Failure to do justice would not lead merely to de-legitimization in the eyes 
of the king's subjects; it might lead to eternal damnation. 
41 Regum est proprium,/acere iudicium atque iusticiam, et liberare de manu calumpniantium vi obpressus, 
et peregrino pupilloque et vidllae, quijacilius obprimatur a potentibus, prebere auxilium. C. 23, q.5, c. 23. 
42 The Treatise on the Laws and Customs a/the Realm o/England Commonly Called Glanvill, ed. by G. 
D. G. Hall (Oxford: OUP, rpt. 2002), p. 2 (prologue). 
43 Diafogus de Scaccario, and Constitulio Domus Regis: The Dialogue 0/ the Exchequer and The 
Establishment 0/ the Royal Household, cd. and trans. by Emilie Amt and S. D. Church (Oxford: OUP, 
2007), pp. 116-7. 
44 Jpsis autem principibus et potestatibus fidem et reverentiam servari oporret, quam qui non exhibuerit 
apud Deum premia invenire non poterit. Commentary post C.23, q.5, c.23 
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The king's duty to do justice was therefore connected to his concern for his soul. While 
the king and his servants were surely th inking of their duty to do justice when they pardoned 
the amercements of paupers, we are a lso presented with cases, like that of the Abbot of 
Meaux, where the pardon docs not appear to make sense from the standpoint of justice. To 
make sense of these pardons, we must tum to the logic of alms. 
Alms worked according to a different kind oflogic than law or justice. It was still a kind 
of logic, however. Theologians and canon lawyers in the universities were able to create 
very sophisticated and rational systems out of the culture of almsgiving. The goal of 
almsgiving was not primarily to produce justice or to see that every man received his due, 
although justice was not entirely absent from the. logic of alms" The theologians and 
canonists argued that all things were owned in common before Adam's and Eve's fall and 
that common ownership was the natural state of things." They extrapolated from thi s that the 
rich owed a duty to distribute their excess wealth to the poor and to spend it on soc ially 
useful projects. They even argued, at times, that the poor, when in a state of absolute 
necessity, had a right to steal from the rich " University scholars could thus think of a lms as 
a way of doing justice to the recipient. 
For the giver, however, alms were also a way to shorten time in purgatory, a goal that 
might have very little to do with the recipien t" There was a sense in the thirteenth century 
that the poor were 'created and placed in the world for the sake of the rich man's salvation' ,.9 
King John, for instance, often fed paupers to atone for eating meat on Fridays or hunting on 
feast days. This became a regular pattern during his reign.w To John, the poor appear to have 
been a ticket to break the Church's commandments. 
Alms cou ld produce mUltiple benefits for their givers. In the second half of the 
thineenth century, Thomas Aquinas summarized a common way of thinking about alms and 
their effect in his Summa The%gica. According to Thomas, alms produced spiritual fruits 
for the giver in two ways. First, 'in so far as a man gives corporal alms out of love for God 
45 There was a theological and canon istic debate oyer whether alms were an act of justice or an act of 
mercy. Brian Tierney, Medieval Poor Law: A Sketch a/Canonical TheOlY alld iIS Applicariol1 in Englalld 
(Berkeley: Uni versity of California Press, 1959), p. 35. 
46 Tierney, Medieval Poor Law, pp . 29, 51. 
47 Tierney, Medieval Poor Law, p. 38. 
48 Tierney, Medieval Poor Law, pp. 34-7. 
49 Michel Mollat, The Poor in (he Middle Ages: An Essay in Social His/ory, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 106. 
50 Virginia A. Cole, 'Royal Almsgiving in Medieval England: A Study in the Ritual and Admin ist rative 
Construction of Kingship' (unpubl ished doctoral thesis, Binghamton University. 2002), pp. 219-220. 
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and his neighbor', they produce a direct spiritual benefit for the giver." They also produce 
spiritual benefit in an indirect way, in that he 'who is succored by corporal alms, is moved 
to pray for his benefactor', 52 Alms were not unidirectional; they operated as a sort of gift 
exchange. This had certainly been the theory behind gifts to monasteries for centuries. 
Donors' names would be recorded in the house's book so that special prayers and masses 
could be said for their souls." 
Not all recipients were created equal, however; some people were morc deserving of 
alms than others. Aquinas tells us that the purpose and motive of alms is 'to relieve one who 
is in need' and that 'we ought to give alms to one who is much holier and in greater want, 
and to one who is more useful to the common wea1'.~ The English royal court practised all 
of these different types of almsgiving. Those ' much holier ' received alms from the royal 
coffers regularly. Giving money or land to churches had long been classified as an act of 
almsgiving in England. Whether a church had received land 'in free and perpetual alms ' 
(/ibera elemasina et perpetual, meaning that the land had been freed of all secular services 
and duties and placed entirely in control of the Church, was often litigated in the king's 
courts." Kings often made gifts to ecclesiastical bodies explicitly for their souls. In 1242, 
Henry [J\ granted certain lands to the prior and brethren of the hospital of St Mary for ten 
years 'for the salvation of his soul' . S6 Individual clerics were also conside;ed proper objects 
of almsgiving. Richard FitzNigel, in describing the way alms should be enrolled in exchequer 
records, lists 'those gifts which the generosity of kings has conferred on churches, or on 
thase wha have served them'." While Meaux and Ramsey might have been particularly good 
targets for alms because John had treated them so roughly, there is no need to assume that 
these previous bad dealings were the on ly reason to pardon their amercements. Pardoning 
an amercement to a religious house could have spiritual benefit simply because it was a 
religious house. 
The king also distributed alms to those who were 'in greater want' on a large scale. 
Henry In had a reputation for piety and was known to be generous in his provision for the 
5 J Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ed. and trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(New York: Benz;ger Brother.;, 1947), p. 1602 (P. 2 P. 2 Q. 32, Art. 4). 
52 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, p. 1602 (P. 2 P. 2 Q. 32, Art. 4). 
53 Stephen D. White, Custom, Kinship, and Gifts to Saints: The Laudatio Parentum in Western France. 
/050-//50 (Chapel Hill: University ofNOr1h Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 26-8. 
54 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, p. 1608 «P. 2 P. 2 Q. 32, Art. 9). 
55 Brae/all on the Laws alld Customs of England, cd. by George E. Woodbine and trans. by Samuel E. 
Thome,4 vots (Cambr;dge, MA: Belknap Press, 1968-1977),;; (1968), p. 93. 
56 Patenl Rolls 1232-1247, p. 334. 
57 Dialogus de Scaccario, p. 44. 
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poor. When Henry gifted land to the hospital ofSt James in Bordeaux ' for the maintenance 
of the poor of the hospital', it was for ' the salvation of the king's soul and the soul s of his 
ancestors and heirs'. '" In 1265, he remitted a payment of 3s. a year to the hospital of St 
Katharine in Gloucestersh ire 'out of pity fortheir poverty ' and ' for the saving of his soul and 
the sou ls of his ancestors and heirs' , S9 Henry even combined concern for the poor with 
concern for clerics when he granted land for an oratory for life to 'Nicholas de Denton, a poor 
clerk' for ' the saving of the king's soul and the souls of his ancestors and heirs '.'" 
An amercement pardon could be seen as a type of alms, albeit an inverted form of 
alms. It was not a payment, but rather the forgiveness of a debt. The logical step from one 
to the other is not a large one. I f we apply the logic of alms to the amercement pardons on 
the plea rolls, we can make sense of pardons that otherwise seem arbitrary. Clerics, for 
instance, were often forgiven their amercements on the plea rolls, occasionally for no other 
stated reason than that they were clerics. In a 1219 case, Alan FitzWilliam, the losing 
demandant in a case, was 'pardoned, because he is a cleric' ,61 In 1223, the prior of Studley, 
like the Abbot of Meaux, was pardoned his amercement ' for God and for the king '." Those 
cases that only make sense according to a logic of alms show us that the king and his officials 
were thinking in terms of alms when they issued at least some oftheir.pardons. Perhaps an 
eleemosynary intention is lying just beneath the surface of the many pardons that also make 
sense according to a logic of justice, such as pardons to paupers. An intention to do justice 
and an intention to give alms need not be mutually exclusive. The king certainly felt that he 
could do both at the same time in the context of homicide pardons. 
Pardoning Killers as a Form of Alms 
At English law, the decision to set a killer free could not be made by a court. Any 
killing, no matter how justified, required a pardon. 63 There were certain types of killings, 
however, for which the king would ordinarily issue a pardon as a matter of course. In the 
thirteenth century, the king would routinely issue pardons in cases where the justices 
58 Palem Rolls 1232-1247, p. 341. 
S9 Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office. 5. Henry fll. A.D. 1258-1266 
[CPR](London: HMSO, 1910), p. 430. 
60 Patent Rolls /258- /266, p. 464. 
61 Perdonatur, quia ciericus est: CRR, viii , p. 161. 
62 CRR, xi, p. 75 (no. 404). 
63 Humard, King's PardonJor Homicide, p. 2S. 
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indicated to him that the killing had been done without a culpablc intent (non-feloniously) " 
The killer's mental state was important to the justices, who probably helped to shape the 
king's pardoning practices. 65 They had taken their emphasis on mental state from Roman 
and canon law, both of which placed a heavy emphasis on the killer 's state of mind in 
determining culpability." Thus, a person who killed in self-defense killed not out of hatred 
or malice for the person he killed, but out ofa desire to save his own life." Since the death 
was the unfortunate consequence of a perfectly licit impulse, the killer was not guilty of a 
crime. The king was thus likely to issue a pardon, on his justices' reconunendation, in cases 
where the killer had killed in self-defense or accidentally.'" 
The king did not always follow these rules, however, and was not bound to follow any 
rules oflaw when granting his pardons. He might pardon because the killer lacked culpability, 
but he might pardon because the killer was his friend, was too powerful to execute, or had a 
powerful patron. Edward I was famous for pardoning many killers in exchange for military 
service in his wars.69 Thirteenth-century justices with Roman and canon law training were 
clearly bothered when the king issued a pardon in a case where the killer had a culpable 
mental state. In the Bracton treatise, written by a group of schools-trained justices between 
the 1220s and the 1250s, one of the authors implicitly criticizes royal pardol)ing practices by 
laying out that in eases where the act of killing 'may be called a felony, perpetrated with evil 
intent and [in aJ premeditated assaul!' the killer 'ought never to be admitted to grace, or only 
with great hesitation, because from such inlawry and such grace easily obtained, from such 
ease of pardon, an excuse for offending is furnished not only to those inlawed but others who 
place their reliance thereon'." These justices felt that the pardon should not be used to excuse 
culpable behavior; it should, rather, be bound by the rules of law. 
64 Hurnard, King s Pardon for Homicide, pp. 77, 220. For a recent discussion of the meaning of the terms 
'fe lony' and 'feloniously' in the medieval English courts that stresses the presence ofa culpable mental 
state, see Elizabeth Papp Kamali, 'Felonia Felonice Facta: Felony and Intentionality in Medieval 
England', Criminal Law and Philosophy < 001 10.1 007/sI1572-0 13-9273-2> [accessed 28 February 
2014] . 
65 Justices in the early thirteenth century often questioned the jury closely on their views of the killer's 
mental state. It is not clear, however, whether they questioned the jurors because they knew the king 
cared about mental state, or whether they cared about mental state and then lobbied the king to issue 
pardons based on it. The justices who wrote Brocton clearly cared about mental state and, as discussed 
below, seem to have resented royal pardons that were based on other grounds. Humard, King s Pardon 
for Homicide, pp. 76-7. 
66 Hurnard, King~' Pardonfor Homicide, pp. 70- 1. 
67 Humard, King 's Pardon for Homicide, pp. 70,74. 
68 Humard, King s Pardon for Homicide, pp. 77-9. 
69 Humard, King s Pardon for Homicide, p. 36. 
70 BrocLOn, ii, p. 372; Humard, King S Pardon for Homicide, p. 226. 
4 
PARDONfNG AS ALMSGIVfNG IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 171 
Modern legal systems have largely adopted the Romano-canonical model for guilt and 
innocence. The killer's state of mind is what differentiates culpable killings from non-
culpable killings, or more culpable killings from less culpable ones. From the perspective of 
a modem scholar looking at the sources through a lens shaped by Roman and canon law, the 
decision to pardon should be based on the killer's culpability at the time the homicide was 
committed. Modern scholars like Humard have followed the justices down the rabbit hole 
of mental state and constructed a world of pardoning where certain pardons were warranted 
because the homicide had been committed with a non-culpable mental Slate and others were 
simple acts of royal will, outside the scope orthe law, and evidence of royal caprice. 
To a thirteenth-century king, however, it might. not have been so clear that the killer and 
his culpability should be the exclusive focus when deciding whether to grant a pardon. 
Certainly the wOl1hiness of the killer had something to do with the king 's decision and was 
probably the primary consideration in most cases. There were some cases, however, in which 
the killer's merit played no role in the pardon. In the fourteenth century, kings occasionally 
pardoned to mark important events in a reign: in 1362, Edward III issued a blanket pardon 
for judicial fines from the eyres in honor of his fiftieth birthday. " Fifteen years later, he 
pardoned all crimes except treason, murder, common theft, and rape to celebrate his royal 
jubilee." Pardoning acted as a symbol of reconciliation between the king and his subjects and 
also put royal power on display." It gave the king an opportunity to show how powerful 
royal mercy actually was. To a certain extent that depended on the king being able to 
demonstrate that he was not bound by the law. The less meritorious the killer pardoned, the 
more the king could drive that point home. 
There is at least one instance of a king granting a blanket pardon that he justified as an 
act of almsgiving. King John issued a pardon in 1204, freeing 'all prisoners, whatever the 
cause for which they may have been detained, whether for murder, felony, or larceny, or 
breaking the forest laws, or for any other wrong whatsoever' .74 John may have done this at 
71 Helen Lacey, The Royal Pardon: Access to Mercy in Fourteenth-Century England (York: York Medieval 
Press, 2009) , p. It 4. 
72 Lacey. The Royal Pardon. p. 115. 
73 Lacey, The Royal Pardon, p. 125. 
74 Rotuli LiUerarum Palelltium in Turri LOlldinens i Asservati, ed. by Thomas Duffus Hardy (London: 
Record Commission, 1835), pp. xv ii , 54. The entry is misdated in RLP. It was issued in 1204, not 1205. 
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least partially to put his power on display at a time when his fortunes were waning, but his 
stated reason for issuing the pardon was 'for the love of God and for the salvation of the soul 
of our dearest mother ', Eleanor of Aquitaine, who had died just a few weeks earlier. 7~ 
This blanket pardon had even less to do with the recipients' merit than Edward's jubilee 
pardon, which excluded the worst categories offelons. In contrast to Edward, John made only 
one distinction based on the type of wrong committed: a killer would have to settle with his 
victim 's kin before he would be set free. lfhe was unable to do so, he would have to abjure 
the realm." All other types of wrongdoers were to be set free so long as they could give 
some kind of security that they would behave themselves in the future." The person who 
killed out of malice aforethought, the robber on the highway, the rapist, and the poacher 
would all receive the same freedom as the person who kilied in self-defense or by aeeident. 
This pardon makes no sense at all if we look at it from the standpoint of justice. John's 
actions appear to be completely lawless. If we look at this pardon through the lens of 
almsgiving. however, it begins to make sense. John was giving something up, and the very 
act of giving up his claim against the wrongdoer was spiritually effieacious. John takes pains 
to make it clear that he is only surrendering his own claim; killers are to make amends with 
the families of their victims. Only those who have broken the forest laws - laws that are 
solely for the benefit of the king, as they protect the royal hunting grounds ~ are said to be 
'altogether liberated', 'S John was also procuring prayers for his mother's soul and on this 
count the blanket pardon might have been particularly efficacious; a felon spared the noose 
would presumably pray somewhat harder than a litigant pardoned an amercement of half a 
mark. 
Nothing demonstrates more elegantly that this pardon was about alms and not about 
law than the fact that murderers and rapists were eligible for pardon, but Jews were 
ineligible." If we try to read this pardon according to a legal logic, the exclusion of Jews 
makes little sense. A Jewish killer would be no more innocent or guilty of the crime than a 
Christian one, simply by virtue of being Jewish. If we read the pardon according to a logic 
75 Pro amore Dei et salule animae karissime marris nostre: ROlltli Litterarum Patentjum, p. 54 This was 
a difficult time in John 's reign. On 6 March, the great Norman fortress of Chateau Gaillard had fallen 
to the King of France and John was quickly losing control of Nonnandy. John Gillingham, 'John 
(1167- 1216)', ODNS <http://www.oxforddnb.comlview/article/ 14841 ?docPos=2> [accessed 28 
February 2014] . Given the ci rcumstances, John may ha vc fe lt the need to reassert his authority in 
England. 
76 ROIuli Litterarum Patentium, pp. xvii , 54. 
77 ROfuii Litrerarum Patenfium, pp. xvii , 54. 
78 ROiuli Liuerarum Pafentium, pp. xvii , 54. 
79 Rotuli Lifterarum Parentium, pp. xvii , 54. 
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of alms, however, the exclusion of Jews from the pardon makes very good sense. John 
wanted Christians, not Jews, praying for his mother's soul. If John's goal was to get his 
mother into heaven, pardoning Jews would not accomplish it. 
The blanket pardons of John and Edward notwithstanding, kings did feel constrained 
by the justices' view of pardoning. In 1227 Henry III sent a letter to the royal justice Martin 
of Patti shall concerning a potential pardon for homicide, asking him 'what grace ... the lord 
king can decently make' ,&0 Even as pardoning practices regularized over the course of the 
tbirteenth century and the king began to leave tbe initial question of whether to pardon to his 
courts, however, he could sti ll imagine the pardon as an act of grace that brought him spiritual 
benefit. At times, the king even claimed spiritual benefit for pardons that should. have been 
issued almost as a matter of course. In January 1260, Henry was staying at St Denis, outside 
Paris, on a visit to his royal colleague and competitor, Louis IX of France. During that visit, 
Henry made three pardons 'for the safety of the soul of Louis, first born son of the king of 
France', who had recently died at the age of six." One was for a homicide that the patent roll 
explicitly says was committed in self-defense, and thus not felonious Y Henry seems to have 
clung to the theory that the pardon was an act of grace and mercy - even though a pardon 
in this case should have been nearly automatic - and enough of an act of grace and mercy 
to give some spiritual benefit to the giver. It is therefore possible thai almsgiving lies just 
beneath the surface of the many pardons that do not explicitly tell us that they are for the 
sa lvation of the king 's soul. By giving pardons to people the royal justices had deemed 
worthy of pardon, the King was exercising his grace to earn himself time out of purgatory." 
Conclusion: Overlapping Discourses of Pardons 
When reading the sources, it is easy to miss the fact that pardons were considered to 
be a form of alms in the thirteenth century. We approach these sources with a modem mindset 
that has been heavily influenced by the Romano-canonical discourse of law, which 
emphasizes thc merit of the party pardoned. We are predisposed to see pardons as acts meant 
80 Humard, King ~ Pardon for Homicide, p. 223. 
81 CPR 1258- 1266, pp. 114-117 (TNA, C66175, mm. 3 and 4). 
82 CPR 1258-1266, p. 11 7 (TNA, C66175, m. 4). 
83 The logic of almsgiving makes better sense of many of these pardons than our current theories. Pardons 
that required the killer to go on pilgrimage or enter a monastery may have had to do with the killer 's 
merit, forcing him to make his peace with God and expiate the sin before he received a pardon, or they 
may have had to do with the victim's soul, as the killer's spiritual acts could be dedicated to his victim. 
Humard, King ~ Pardon for Homicide. p. 36. A possibility Ihat has never been cons idered is that the 
pilgrimage might ha\"e been meant to benefit the king, who had given up his own right to vengeance 
for breach of his peace when he pardoncd the killer. 
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to further justice and most of the pardons on the rolls look like they were issued out ofa sense 
of justice. The legal discourse of pardons favored by the schools-trai ned justices who wrote 
Brae/on and the alms-based discourse of pardons employed by kings often overlapped. A 
pauper 's amercement pardon could be characterized as an act of justice, in line with Magna 
Carta's pronouncement that a man should not be amerced to the point that it would destroy 
his livelihood. It could also be characterized as an act of alms, a giflto a poor person that, 
if it cost the king treasure in this world, would build up treasure for him in the next. 
The few cases where the record explicitly records that the pardon was made for 
someone's soul or where the pardon wou ld not make sense according to a logic of justice 
show us that, at least in some cases, the king and hi s officials saw pardons as a fann of alms. 
But some of the justices resented pardons that did not operate according to a legal logic. 
Justices like Martin of Patti shall, Willi am of Raleigh , and Henry of Bratton presented 
themselves as the masters of an independent legal discourse. They alone had the knowledge 
of Roman and canon law required to expound and apply the law of the realm. Pardons that 
did not align with Romano-canonical ideas of guilt and innocence, given to people who 
'ought never to be admitted to grace' , were arbitrary in their eyes and were thus aberrations, 
acts of wi ll that detracted from the law. 84 The justices who wrote Braelon were trying to 
differentiate themselves from the rest of the royal administration and to argue that the work 
they were doing was the impersonal work of the law, not the very personal work of 
distributing the king's alms. It is worth noting that, at the same time they were denigrating 
the use of the pardon to do anything but justice in the Romano-canonical sense, they were 
participating in the royal almsgiving system. The justices who were most involved in trying 
to create an image of the justice as a servant of the law were also noting on their rolls that 
amercements were forgiven for the king 's soul. The notation for the abbey of Meaux appears 
on the roll of the justice Martin of Paltishall , and probably was written by his clerk William 
of Raleigh, the most likely candidate for the primary author of Brae/on." If a clerk like 
Raleigh objected to thi s display of royal piety, he could easily have simply noted 'it is 
pardoned' as the clerks so often did.86 The same justices who resented pardons that violated 
the norms of the law could see their work as simultaneously the work of law and as the 
salvation of the king's soul. 
84 Braeton, ii , p. 372. 
85 Paul Brand, 'The Age of Bracton ', in The History of English Law: Centenary Essays on 'Pollock and 
Maitland', ed. by John Hudson, Proceedings of the British Academy, 89 (Oxford: OUP, 1996), pp. 65-
90 (p. 78). 
86 Henry of Bratton, who probably also worked on the Bracton treatise during his time as Raleigh's clerk, 
noted on hi s roll of 1253 that an amercement was pardoned ' for God and fo r the king': TNA 
JUSTIII178, m. 20d. 
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Thirteenth-century courts were complex institutions that could be understood in 
different ways by different groups of people. While some of the justices of his courts 
advocated for a view of the royal courts as temples of the law, spaces where the justices 
represented the king in his capacity as God's vicegerent on earth, placed here to do justice 
to his subjects, the king and many of his officials could see the court as an extension not of 
the king's office, but of his person. It was a place where royal alms were distributed for the 
benefit of the king's soul and those of his relatives. This did not make the court an irrational 
place. It was simply a place that operated according to a different kind of logic. 
